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Abstract—The growing size of modern datasets necessitates
a massive computation into smaller computations and operate
in a distributed manner for improving overall performance.
However, the adversarial servers in the distributed computing
system deliberately send erroneous data in order to affect the
computation for their benefit. Computing Boolean functions is
the key component of many applications of interest, e.g., the
classification problem, verification functions in the blockchain
and the design of cryptographic algorithm. In this paper, we
consider the problem of computing the Boolean function in
which the computation is carried out distributively across several
workers with particular focus on security against Byzantine
workers. We note that any Boolean function can be modeled
as a multivariate polynomial which have high degree in general.
Hence, the recent proposed Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC)
can be used to simultaneously provide resiliency, security, and
privacy. However, the security threshold (i.e., the maximum
number of adversarial workers can be tolerated) provided by
LCC can be extremely low if the degree of polynomial is high.
Our goal is to design an efficient coding scheme which achieves
the optimal security threshold with low decoding overhead. We
propose three different schemes called coded Algebraic normal
form (ANF), coded Disjunctive normal form (DNF) and coded
polynomial threshold function (PTF). Instead of modeling the
Boolean function as a general polynomial, the key idea of the
proposed schemes is to model it as the concatenation of some
low-degree polynomials and the threshold functions. In terms of
the security threshold, we show that the proposed coded ANF
and coded DNF are optimal. For the Boolean functions with the
polynomial size of sparsity and weight, it is demonstrated that the
proposed coded PTF outperforms LCC in terms of the security
threshold and the decoding complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing size of modern datasets for applications
such as machine learning and data science, it is necessary to
partition a massive computation into smaller computations and
perform these smaller computations in a distributed manner
for improving overall performance [1]. However, distributing
the computations to some external entities, which are not
necessarily trusted, i.e., adversarial servers make security a
major concern [2]–[4]. Thus, it is important to provide security
against adversarial workers that deliberately send erroneous
data in order to affect the computation for their benefit.
Computing Boolean functions is the key component of
many applications of interest. For instance, learning a Boolean
function for the inference of classification in discrete attribute
spaces from examples of its input/output behavior has been
widely studied in the past few decades [5]. The examples in
the classification problem are represented by binary (0 or 1)
attributes, and the inference can be converted into a Boolean
function which outputs the category of each example belongs
to [6]. For hash functions based on bit mixing (e.g., SHA-2),
the Boolean functions are used to represent the verification
functions. Moreover, Boolean functions are also primarily used
in in the design of cryptographic algorithm [7].
In this paper, we consider the problem of computing the
Boolean function in which the computation is carried out
distributively across several workers with particular focus
on security against Byzantine workers. Specifically, using a
master-worker distributed computing system with N workers,
the goal is to compute the Boolean function f : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1} over a large dataset ~X = (X1, X2, . . . , XK), i.e.,
f(X1), . . . , f(XK), in which the (encoded) datasets are pre-
stored in the workers such that the computations can be secure
against adversarial workers in the system.
Any Boolean function can be modeled as an Algebraic
normal form (i.e., multivariate polynomial). Thus, the recent
proposed Lagrange Coded Computing (LCC) [8], an universal
encoding technique for arbitrary multivariate polynomial com-
putations, can be used to simultaneously alleviate the issues of
resiliency, security, and privacy. The security threshold (maxi-
mum number of adversarial workers can be tolerated) provided
by LCC is N−(K−1)degf−12 which can be extremely low if
the degree of polynomial degf is high. Such degree problem
can be further amplified in complex Boolean functions whose
degree can grow exponentially in general. Thus, we aim at
designing the efficient coding scheme achieves the optimal
security threshold with low decoding overhead.
A. Main Contributions
As main contributions of the paper is that instead of model-
ing the Boolean function as a general polynomial, we propose
the three proposed schemes modeling it as the concatenation of
some low-degree polynomials and the threshold functions (see
Figure 1). To illustrate the main idea of the proposed schemes,
consider an AND function of three input bits X[1], X[2], X[3]
which is formally defined by f(X) = X[1] ∧ X[2] ∧ X[3].
The function f can be modeled as a polynomial function
(Algebraic normal form) X[1]X[2]X[3] which has a degree
of 3. For this polynomial, LCC achieves the security thresh-
old N−3(K−1)−12 . Instead of directly computing the degree-
3 polynomial, our proposed approach is to model it as a
linear threshold function sgn(X[1] +X[2] + [3]− 52 ) in which
f(X) = 1 if and only if sgn(X[1] + X[2] + [3] − 52 ) > 0.
Then, a simple linear code (e.g., (N,K) MDS code) can be
used for computing the linear function X[1] +X[2] + [3]− 52 ,
which provides the optimal security threshold N−K2 .
We propose three different schemes called coded Algebraic
normal form (ANF), coded Disjunctive normal form (DNF)
and coded polynomial threshold function (PTF). The idea
behind coded ANF (DNF) is to first decompose the Boolean
function into some monomials (clauses) and then construct a
linear threshold function for each monomial (clause). Then, an
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Fig. 1: Modeling the Boolean function as a general polynomial can
result in high degree of computations which makes the security
threshold low by using LCC encoding. The main idea of our proposed
approach is to model it as the concatenation of some low-degree
polynomials and the threshold functions.
(N,K) MDS code is used to encode the datasets. On the other
hand, the proposed coded PTF models the Boolean function
as a low-degree polynomial threshold function, then LCC is
used for the data encoding.
In Table I, we summarize the performance comparison of
LCC and the proposed three schemes in terms of the secu-
rity threshold and the decoding complexity. For any general
Boolean function f , the proposed coded ANF and coded DNF
achieve the best security threshold N−K2 (matches to the
theoretical outer bound) which is independent of degf . As
compared to LCC, coded ANF and coded DNF provides the
substantial improvement on the security threshold.
In particular, coded ANF has the decoding complexity
O(r(f)N log2N log logN) which works well for the Boolean
functions with low sparsity r(f); coded DNF has the de-
coding complexity O(w(f)N log2N log logN) which works
well for the Boolean functions with small weight w(f) (see
the definitions of r(f) and w(f) in Section II). For the
Boolean functions with the polynomial size of r(f) and w(f),
coded PTF outperforms LCC by achieving the better security
threshold and the almost linear decoding complexity which is
independent of m (see more details in Section VI).
B. Related Prior Work
Coded computing broadly refers to a family of techniques
that utilize coding to inject computation redundancy in order to
alleviate the various issues that arise in large-scale distributed
computing. In the past few years, coded computing has had
a tremendous success in various problems, such as straggler
Security Threshold Decoding Complexity
LCC N−(K−1)deff−1
2
O(N log3N log logN)
coded ANF N−K
2
O(r(f)N log2N log logN)
coded DNF N−K
2
O(w(f)N log2N log logN)
coded PTF N−(K−1)(blog2 w(f)c+1)−1
2
O(N log2N log logN)
Outer Bound N−K
2
-
TABLE I: Performance comparison of LCC and the proposed three
schemes for the Boolean function f(X) which has the sparsity r(f)
and weight w(f).
mitigation and bandwidth reduction (e.g., [9]–[16]). Coded
computing has also been expanded in various directions,
such as heterogeneous networks (e.g., [17]), partial stragglers
(e.g., [18]), secure and private computing (e.g., [8], [19]–[22]),
distributed optimization (e.g., [23]) and dynamic networks
(e.g., [24]). So far, research in coded computing has focused on
developing frameworks for some linear function (e.g., matrix
multiplications). However, there has been no works prior to our
work that consider coded computing for Boolean functions.
Compared with LCC, we make the substantial progress of
improving the security threshold by proposing coded ANF,
coded DNF and coded PTF.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the problem of evaluating a Boolean function
f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} over a dataset ~X = (X1, . . . , XK),
where X1, X2, . . . , XK ∈ {0, 1}m. Given a distributed com-
puting environment with a master and N workers, our goal is
to compute f(X1), . . . , f(XK).
Each Boolean function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} can be
represented by an Algebraic normal form (ANF) as follows:
f(X) =
⊕
S⊆[m]
µf (S)
∏
j∈S
X[j] (1)
where X[j] is the j-bit of data X and µf (S) ∈ {0, 1} is the
ANF coefficient of the corresponding monomial
∏
j∈S X[j].
We denote the degree of Boolean function f by degf and the
sparsity (number of monomials) of f by r(f), i.e., r(f) =∑
S⊆[m] µf (S).
Furthermore, we denote the support of f by Supp(f) which
is the set of vectors in {0, 1}m such that f = 1, i.e.,
Supp(f) = {X ∈ {0, 1}m : f(X) = 1}. Let w(f) be the
weight of Boolean function f , defined by w(f) = |Supp(f)|.
Alternatively, each Boolean function f can be represented by
a Disjunctive normal form (DNF) as follows:
f = T1 ∨ T2 ∨ · · · ∨ Tw(f) (2)
where each clause Ti has m literals which corresponds to an
input Yi such that f(Yi) = 1. For example, if Yi = 001, then
the corresponding clause is ∼ Yi[0]∧ ∼ Yi[1] ∧ Yi[2].
Prior to computation, each worker has already stored a
fraction of the dataset in a possibly coded manner. Specifically,
each worker n stores X˜n = gn(X1, . . . , XK), where gn is
the encoding function of worker n. Each worker n computes
hn(X˜n) and returns the result to the master, in which hn is the
function decided by the master. Then, the master aggregates
the results from the workers until it receives a decodable set of
local computations. We say a set of computations is decodable
if f(X1), . . . , f(XK) can be obtained by computing decoding
functions over the received results. More concretely, given any
subset of workers that return the computing results (denoted by
K), the master computes vK({hn(X˜n)}n∈K), where each vK
is a deterministic function. We refer to the vK’s as decoding
functions.
In particular, we focus on finding the coding scheme to
be robust to as many adversarial workers as possible in the
system. The following term defines the security which can be
provided by a coding scheme.
Definition 1 (Security Threshold). For an integer b, we say
a scheme S is b-secure if the master can be robust against
b adversaries. The security threshold, denoted by βS , is the
maximum value of b such that a scheme S is b-secure, i.e.,
βS , sup{b : S is b-secure}. (3)
Based on the above system model, the problem is now
formulated as: What is the coding scheme which achieves the
optimal security threshold with low decoding complexity?
III. OVERVIEW OF LAGRANGE CODED COMPUTING
In this section, we consider Lagrange Coded Computing
(LCC) [8] and show how it works for our problem.
Since Lagrange coded computing requires the underlying
field size to be at least the number of workers N , we first
extend the field size of {0, 1}m such that the size of extension
field is at least the number of workers N . More specifically,
we embed each bit Xk[j] ∈ {0, 1} of data Xk into a binary
extension filed {0, 1}t such that with 2t ≥ N . The embedding
X¯k[j] of the bit Xk[j] is generated such that
X¯k[j] =

00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, Xk[j] = 0,
00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
1, Xk[j] = 1.
(4)
Note that over extension field the output of Boolean function
f is 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
if the original result is 0; 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
1 if the original
result is 1.
For the data encoding by using LCC, we first select K
distinct elements β1, β2, . . . , βK from extension field {0, 1}t,
and let u be the respective Lagrange interpolation polynomial:
u(z) ,
K∑
k=1
X¯k
∏
l∈[K]\{k}
z − βl
βk − βl , (5)
where u : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}mt is a polynomial of degree
K − 1 such that u(βk) = X¯k. Then we can select distinct
elements α1, α2, . . . , αN from extension field {0, 1}t, and
encode X¯1, . . . , X¯K to X˜n = u(αn) for all n ∈ [N ], i.e.,
X˜n = u(αn) ,
K∑
k=1
X¯k
∏
l∈[K]\{k}
αn − βl
βk − βl . (6)
Each worker n ∈ [N ] stores X˜n locally. Following the above
data encoding, each worker n computes function f on X¯n and
sends the result back to the master upon its completion.
In the following, we present the security threshold provided
by LCC. By [8], to be robust to b adversarial workers (given
N and K), LCC requires N ≥ (K − 1)degf + 2b + 1; i.e.,
LCC achieves the security threshold
βLCC =
N − (K − 1)degf − 1
2
. (7)
After receiving results from the workers, the master can obtain
all coefficients of f(u(z)) by applying Reed-Solomon decod-
ing [25], [26]. Having this polynomial, the master evaluates
it at βk for every k ∈ [K] to obtain f(u(βk)) = f(X¯k).
The complexity of decoding a length-N Reed-Solomon code
with dimension t is O(tN log2N log logN). To have a suf-
ficiently large field for LCC, we pick t = dlogNe. Thus,
the decoding process by the master requires complexity
O(N log3N log logN).
The security threshold achieved by LCC depends on the
degree of function f , i.e., the security guarantee is highly
degraded if f has high degree. To mitigate such degree
effect, we model the Boolean function as the concatenation
of some low-degree polynomials and the threshold functions
by proposing three schemes in the following sections.
IV. SCHEME 1: CODED ALGEBRAIC NORMAL FORM
In this section, we propose a coding scheme called coded
Algebraic normal form (ANF) which computes the ANF
representation of Boolean function by the linear threshold
functions (LTF) and a simple linear code is used for the data
encoding. We start with an example to illustrate the idea of
coded ANF.
Example 1. We consider a function which has an ANF
representation defined as follows:
f(X) = X[1]X[2] ·X[m
2
]. (8)
Then, we define a linear function over the real field:
L(X) =
m
2∑
j=1
X[j]− m
2
+
1
2
(9)
where L(X) = 12 if and only if f(X) = 1. Otherwise,
L(X) ≤ − 12 . Thus, we can compute f(X) by computing
its corresponding linear threshold function sgn(L(X)), i.e.,
f(X) = 1 if sgn(L(X)) = 1; otherwise, f(X) = 0 if
sgn(L(X)) = −1. Unlike computing the function f(X)
with the degree m2 which results in low security threshold,
computing the linear function L(X) allows us to apply a linear
code on the computations.
A. Formal Description of coded ANF
Given the ANF representation defined in (1), we now
present the proposed coded ANF as follows. For each mono-
mial
∏
j∈S X[j] such that µf (S) = 1, we define a linear
function LS(X) as follows:
LS(X) =
∑
j∈S
X[j]− |S|+ 1
2
(10)
It is clear that LS(X) = 12 if and only if
∏
j∈S X[j] = 1.
Otherwise, LS(X) ≤ − 12 . Thus, there are r(f) constructed
linear threshold functions, and each monomial
∏
j∈S X[j] can
be computed by its corresponding linear threshold function
sgn(LS(X)).
The master encodes X1, X2, . . . , XK to X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜N
over the real field using an (N,K) MDS code. Each worker
n ∈ [N ] stores X˜n locally. Each worker n ∈ [N ] com-
putes the functions {LS(X˜n)}{S⊆[m],µf (S)=1} and then sends
the results back to the master. After receiving the results
from the workers, the master first recovers LS(Xk) for each
k ∈ [K] and each S ∈ {G : G ⊆ [m], µf (G) = 1}.
Then, the master has
∏
j∈S Xk[j] = 1 if sgn(LS(Xk)) = 1;∏
j∈S Xk[j] = 0 if sgn(LS(Xk)) = −1. Lastly, the master
recovers f(X1), . . . , f(XK) by summing the monomials.
B. Security Threshold of Coded ANF
To decode the (N,K) MDS code, coded ANF applies Reed-
Solomon decoding. Successful decoding requires the number
of errors of computation results such that N ≥ K + 2b. The
following theorem shows the security achieved by coded ANF.
Theorem 1. Given a number of workers N and a dataset
X = (X1, . . . , XK), the proposed coded ANF can be robust
to b adversaries for computing {f(Xk)}Kk=1 for any Boolean
function f , as long as
N ≥ K + 2b; (11)
i.e., coded ANF achieves the security threshold
βANF =
N −K
2
. (12)
Whenever the master receives N results from the workers,
the master decodes the computation results using a length-N
Reed-Solomon code for each of r(f) linear functions which
incurs the total complexity O(r(f)N log2N log logN). Com-
puting all the monomials via the signs of corresponding linear
threshold functions incurs the complexity O(Nr(f)). Lastly,
computing f(X1), . . . , f(XK) by summing the monomials
incurs the complexity O(Nr(f)) since there are r(f) − 1
additions in function f . Thus, the total complexity of decoding
step is O(r(f)N log2N log logN) which works well for small
r(f). Note that the operation of this scheme is over the real
field whose size doesn’t scale with size of m.
V. SCHEME 2: CODED DISJUNCTIVE NORMAL FORM
In this section, we propose a coding scheme called coded
Disjunctive normal form (DNF) which computes the DNF
representation of Boolean function by LTFs and a simple linear
code is used for the data encoding. We start with an example
to illustrate the idea behind coded DNF.
Example 2. Consider a function which has an ANF represen-
tation defined as follows:
f(X) = (X[1] · · ·X[m])⊕ (X[1]⊕ 1) · · · (X[m]⊕ 1)
which has the degree degf = m − 1 and the number of
monomials r(f) = 2m − 1. Alternatively, this function has
a DNF representation as follows:
f(X) = (X[1] ∧ · · · ∧X[m]) ∨ (∼ X[1] ∧ · · · ∧ ∼ X[m])
which has the weight w(f) = 2.
For the clause X[1]∧· · ·∧X[m], we define a linear function
over the real field:
L1(X) = X[1] + · · ·+X[m]−m+ 1
2
. (13)
where X[0] ∧ · · · ∧ X[m] = 1 if and only if L1(X) = 12 .
Otherwise, L1(X) ≤ − 12 . Similarly, for the clause ∼ X[0] ∧· · · ∧ ∼ X[m], we define a linear function over the real field:
L2(X) = −X[1]− · · · −X[m] + 1
2
(14)
where ∼ X[1]∧· · · ∧ ∼ X[m] = 1 if and only if L2(X) = 12 .
Otherwise, L2(X) ≤ −12 . Therefore, we can compute f(X)
by computing sgn(L1(X)) and sgn(L2(X)), i.e., f(X) = 1
if at least one of sgn(L1(X)) and sgn(L2(X)) is equal to 1.
Otherwise, f(X) = 0. Unlike directly computing the function
f(X) with the degree of m−1, computing the linear functions
L1(X) and L2(X) allows us to apply a linear code on the
computations.
A. Formal Description of coded DNF
Given the DNF representation defined in (2), we now
present the proposed coded DNF as follows. For each clause
Ti with the corresponding input Yi such that f(Yi) = 1, we
define a linear function Li(X) over the real field:
Li(X) =
m∑
j=1
Zi[j]X[j]−
m∑
j=1
Yi[j] +
1
2
(15)
where
Zi[j] =
{
1, if Yi[j] = 1
−1, if Yi[j] = 0.
(16)
It is clear that Li(Yi) = 12 and Li(X) ≤ − 12 for all other
inputs X 6= Yi. Thus, there are w(f) constructed linear
threshold functions, and each clause Ti can be computed by
its corresponding linear threshold function sgn(Li(X)).
The master encodes X1, X2, . . . , XK to X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜N
over the real field using an (N,K) MDS code. Each worker
n ∈ [N ] stores X˜n locally. Each worker n computes the func-
tions L1(X˜n), . . . , Lw(f)(X˜n) and then sends the results back
to the master. After receiving the results from the workers,
the master first recovers Li(Xk) for each i ∈ [w(f)] and each
k ∈ [K] via MDS decoding. Then, the master has Ti(Xk) = 1
if sgn(Li(Xk)) = 1; otherwise Ti(Xk) = 0. Lastly, the master
has f(Xk) = 1 if at least one of T1(Xk), . . . , Tw(f)(Xk) is
equal to 1. Otherwise, f(Xk) = 0.
B. Security Threshold of Coded DNF
Similar to coded ANF, we present the following theorem
shows the security threshold achieved by the coded DNF.
Theorem 2. Given a number of workers N and a dataset
X = (X1, . . . , XK), the proposed coded DNF can be robust
to b adversaries for computing {f(Xk)}Kk=1 for any Boolean
function f , as long as
N ≥ K + 2b; (17)
i.e., coded DNF achieves the security threshold
βDNF =
N −K
2
. (18)
Whenever the master receives N results from the workers,
the master decodes the computation results using a length-N
Reed-Solomon code for each of w(f) linear functions which
incurs the total complexity O(w(f)N log2N log logN). Com-
puting all the clauses via the signs of corresponding linear
threshold functions incurs the complexity O(Nw(f)). Lastly,
computing f(X1), . . . , f(XK) by checking all the clauses
requires the complexity O(Nw(f)). Thus, the total complexity
of decoding step is O(w(f)N log2N log logN) which works
well for small w(f).
VI. SCHEME 3: CODED POLYNOMIAL THRESHOLD
FUNCTION
In this section, we propose a coding scheme called coded
polynomial threshold function which computes the DNF rep-
resentation of Boolean function by the polynomial threshold
functions (PTF) and LCC is used for the data encoding.
A. Formal Description of coded PTF
Given the DNF representation defined in (2), we now
present the proposed coded PTF. Following the construction
proposed in [27], [28], we now construct a polynomial thresh-
old function sgn(P (X)) for computing f(X) where P (X) is
a polynomial function with the degree at most blog2 w(f)c+1.
The construction of such PTF has the following steps.
Decision Tree Construction: We construct an w(f)-leaf
decision tree over variables X[1], . . . , X[m] such that each
input in Supp(f) arrives at a different leaf. Such a tree can be
always constructed by a greedy algorithm. Let `i be a leaf
of this tree in which Yi reaches leaf `i. We label `i with
the linear threshold function sgn(Li(X)) defined in (15). The
constructed decision tree, in which internal nodes are labeled
with variables and leaves are labeled with linear threshold
functions, computes exactly f .
Decision List: For this w(f)-leaf decision tree, we construct
an equivalent blog2 w(f)c-decision list. Following from the
definition that the rank of an w(f)-leaf tree is at most
blog2 w(f)c. We find a leaf in the decision tree at distance at
most blog2 w(f)c from the root, and place the literals along the
path to the leaf as a monomial at the top of a new decision list.
We then remove the leaf from the tree, creating a new decision
tree with one fewer leaf, and repeat this process [29]. Without
loss of generality, we let `i be the i-th removed leaf in the
process of list construction with the corresponding monomial
Ci of at most blog2 w(f)c variables. The constructed list is
defined as "if C1(X) = 1 then output
1+sgn(L1(X))
2 ; else if
C2(X) = 1 then output
1+sgn(L2(X))
2 ; ... else if Cw(f)(X) = 1
then output 1+sgn(Lw(f)(X))2 .
Polynomial Threshold Function: Having the constructed
decision list, we now construct the polynomial function P (X)
with degree of at most blogw(f)c+ 1 as follows:
P (X) = A1C1(X)L1(X) + · · ·+Aw(f)Cw(f)(X)Lw(f)(X)
where A1  A2  A3 · · ·  Am > 0 are appropriately
chosen positive values.
The master encodes X1, X2, . . . , XK to X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜N
over the real field using LCC. Each worker n ∈ [N ] stores
X˜n locally. Each worker n computes the function P (X˜n)
and then sends the result back to the master. After receiv-
ing the results from the workers, the master first recovers
P (X1), . . . , P (XK) via LCC decoding. Then, the master has
f(Xk) = 1 if sgn(P (Xk)) = 1; otherwise f(Xk) = 0.
B. Security Threshold of Coded PTF
Since P (X) has degree of at most blog2 w(f)c + 1, to be
robust to b adversaries, LCC requires the number of workers
N such that N ≥ (K − 1)(blog2 w(f)c+ 1) + 2b+ 1. Then,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given a number of workers N and a dataset
X = (X1, . . . , XK), the proposed coded polynomial thresh-
old function can be robust to b adversaries for computing
{f(Xk)}Kk=1 for any Boolean function f , as long as
N ≥ (K − 1)(blog2 w(f)c+ 1) + 2b+ 1; (19)
i.e., coded PTF achieves the security threshold
βPTF =
N − (K − 1)(blog2 w(f)c+ 1)− 1
2
. (20)
Whenever the master receives N results from the workers,
the master decodes the computation results using a length-
N Reed-Solomon code for the polynomial function which
incurs the total complexity O(N log2N log logN). Lastly,
computing f(X1), f(X2), . . . , f(XK) by checking the signs
requires the complexity O(N). Thus, the total complexity of
decoding step is O(N log2N log logN).
In the following example, we show that coded PTF outper-
forms LCC for the Boolean functions with the polynomial size
of r(f) and w(f).
Example 3. Consider a function which has an ANF represen-
tation defined as follows:
f(X) = (X[1]⊕X[2]) · · · (X[2m′ − 1])⊕X[2m′])
×X[2m′ + 1] · · ·X[m] (21)
where m′ = blog2m2c. Note that here we focus on the case
that m is large enough such that m > m′ = blog2m2c. The
function f has the degree of m − blog2m2c, the sparsity of
≈ m2 and the weight of ≈ m2.
For the Boolean function considered in Example
3, coded PTF achieves the security threshold
N−(K−1)(blog2m2c+1)−1
2 which is greater than the security
threshold N−(K−1)(m−blog2m
2c)−1
2 provided by LCC.
Although coded ANF and coded DNF achieve the optimal
security threshold N−K2 but they require decoding complexity
O(m2N log2N log logN) which has the order of m2, i.e.,
they only work for small m. With the security slightly worse
than coded ANF and coded DNF, coded PTF achieves the
better decoding complexity which is independent of m, i.e.,
coded PTF works for large m.
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